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Abstract 
The tendency for the mind to wander to concerns other than the task in hand is a fundamental 
feature of human cognition, yet the consequence of variations in its experiential content for 
psychological functioning are not well understood. Here, we adopted a multivariate pattern 
analysis approach, simultaneously decomposing experience sampling data with neural 
functional connectivity data, revealing dimensions that simultaneously describe individual 
variation in self-reported experience and default mode network connectivity. We identified 
dimensions corresponding to traits of positive, habitual thoughts and spontaneous task-
unrelated thoughts. These dimensions were uniquely related to aspects of cognition, such as 
executive control and the ability to generate information in a creative fashion, and 
independently distinguished well-being measures. These data provide the most convincing 
evidence to date for an ontological view of the mind-wandering state as encompassing a 
broad range of different experiences and that this heterogeneity underlies its complex 
relationship to psychological functioning. 
 
Keywords: mind-wandering, default mode network, content regulation, ontology of 
spontaneous thought. 
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Introduction 
Although our minds frequently wander from events in the here-and-now, or any task 
being performed, the functional consequences of this state remain poorly understood 
(Mittner, Hawkins, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2016; Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016; 
Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Some studies link mind-wandering to unhappiness 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), others suggest it facilitates recovery from negative emotional 
states (Poerio, Totterdell, Emerson, & Miles, 2016; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013). 
Mind-wandering is associated with poorer performance on executively demanding tasks 
(McVay & Kane, 2009; Mrazek et al., 2012), yet studies of problem solving suggest it may 
promote creativity (Baird et al., 2012; Smeekens & Kane, 2016). This wide range of associated 
functional outcomes is puzzling - if mind-wandering is a homogeneous construct, then it is 
unclear why it should be associated with such a complex array of often opposing outcomes. 
To reconcile this contradictory evidence, mind-wandering has been suggested to be 
heterogeneous, encompassing multiple states, with differential contents and underlying 
cognitive architectures (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). According to this ontological 
perspective, different functional associations arise from different ‘types’ of experience, 
explaining the range of functional outcomes observed in the literature. 
In the current study, we recruited 165 participants and obtained data on (a) the 
organization of the brain at rest using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (b) the 
content and form of experience recorded across different days, (c) cognitive functions 
assessed by a comprehensive battery of tasks (including memory, creativity, and executive 
control) and (d) psychological well-being via questionnaires.  Our procedure is presented in 
Figure 1. These data allowed us to use novel multivariate analysis methods to test the 
hypothesis that there are different types of mind-wandering, with unique neural and 
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experiential patterns, accounting for unique variance in the psychological profile of our 
sample. 
 
Figure 1.  Schematic of the procedure and analysis strategy employed in the current study. 
 
We used functional connection strength to characterize the neural organization of 
each individual. We selected regions for our analysis based on evidence that task-unrelated 
thoughts are linked to concurrent increases in activity in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and 
posterior cingulate cortex (pCC) and lateral parietal cortex (for meta-analyses, see Fox, 
Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015) - 
regions that make up the core of the default mode network (DMN;  Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, 
& Schacter, 2008). During mind-wandering, it is believed that these regions interact with 
other areas of cortex, in particular, temporal lobe regions associated with memory 
representation that are also allied to the DMN. For example, the hippocampus activates early 
during mind-wandering (Ellamil et al., 2016) while connectivity between lateral and medial 
aspects of the temporal lobe and the DMN core predicts individual variation in features of 
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mind-wandering, such as its episodic content (Karapanagiotidis, Bernhardt, Jefferies, & 
Smallwood, 2017; Smallwood et al., 2016).  Contemporary accounts of mind-wandering argue 
the DMN may be important for automatic aspects of cognition (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, 
& Andrews-Hanna, 2016). Other studies have highlighted links with lateral prefrontal cortex 
important for executive control when mind-wandering is more deliberate (e.g. Golchert et al., 
2017). 
We applied multivariate pattern analysis to the neuro-cognitive and experiential data 
to identify different types of mind-wandering. If the DMN is important for automatic aspects 
of cognition (Christoff et al., 2016), states linked to high levels of connectivity within this 
system may have experiential features reflecting more automatic types of cognition. Our a 
priori decision to focus on the DMN core to derive patterns of experience limits our ability to 
observe interactions with regions outside of this system, so we used whole brain functional 
connectivity to characterize these links for each type of experience. Based on prior studies 
(e.g. Ellamil et al., 2016; Golchert et al., 2017; Smallwood et al., 2016), we expected this 
analysis to identify connections with regions in the temporal lobe or the executive system. 
This pattern would confirm the hypothesized accounts of the DMN as important in integrating 
neural information (Margulies et al., 2016; Smallwood et al., 2016). Having characterized 
different types of mind-wandering in both brain and experience, we used these to test the 
hypothesis that different categories of experience are related to different functional 
outcomes. We performed an individual differences analysis to understand whether our 
characterized types of mind-wandering have unique functional associations, including better 
creativity, worse executive control or levels of well-being. We expected different patterns of 
experience to capture different psychological profiles explaining the heterogeneous pattern 
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of functional outcomes that have been linked to the mind-wandering state in previous studies 
(Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). 
 
Methods 
Participants 
One hundred and sixty-five healthy participants were recruited from the University of 
York (female = 99; age range 18 – 31, M = 20.43, SD = 2.63).  Our sample size was selected as 
being approximately double those used in our prior studies (e.g. Smallwood et al., 2016). 
Assuming a typical correlation of between .20 and .30 (Hemphill, 2003), a sample size of at 
least 125 is recommended in order to have 95% confidence that a correlation of typical size 
is present and greater than 0. Participants were right handed, native English speakers, with 
normal/corrected vision and no history of psychiatric or neurological illness. Participants 
underwent MRI scanning, completed an online questionnaire and then attended three two-
hour behavioral testing sessions to complete a battery of cognitive tasks. The behavioral 
sessions took place within a week of the scan. Eight participants were excluded from the 
multivariate pattern analysis because they failed to complete all of the behavioral testing 
sessions. In total 157 participants were included in the multivariate pattern analysis and the 
comparison with cognitive performance. One hundred and forty-two participants completed 
both the behavioral testing sessions and questionnaires and were included in the analysis 
associated with well-being. Participants were rewarded with either a payment of £80 or a 
commensurate amount of course credit. All participants provided written consent prior to the 
fMRI session and the first behavioral testing session. Ethical approval was obtained from the 
Ethics committee of the University of York Department of Psychology and the University of 
York Neuroimaging Centre. 
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MRI acquisition 
Structural and functional data were acquired using a 3T GE HDx Excite MRI scanner 
utilizing an eight-channel phased array head coil (GE) tuned to 127.4 MHz, at the York 
Neuroimaging Centre, University of York. Structural MRI acquisition in all participants was 
based on a T1-weighted 3D fast spoiled gradient echo sequence (TR = 7.8 s, TE = minimum 
full, flip angle= 20°, matrix size = 256 x 256, 176 slices, voxel size = 1.13 x 1.13 x 1 mm).  
Resting-state activity was recorded from the whole brain using single-shot 2D gradient-echo-
planar imaging (TR = 3 s, TE = minimum full, flip angle = 90°, matrix size = 64 x 64, 60 slices, 
voxel size = 3 x 3 x 3 mm3, 180 volumes). Participants viewed a fixation cross with eyes open 
for the durations of the nine minute functional MRI resting state scan. A FLAIR scan with the 
same orientation as the functional scans was collected to improve co-registration between 
subject-specific structural and functional scans. 
Questionnaires 
We administered a battery of questionnaires to comprehensively assess a diverse 
range of trait-level individual differences that have been previously related to mind-
wandering. These questionnaires captured the trait-like features of participants’ 
psychological state, particularly aspects of well-being. The complete details of the 
questionnaires are presented in the supplementary materials. 
Behavioral testing sessions 
The trait profiles captured by questionnaires were complemented by measures of task 
performance on a range of cognitive tasks. Behavioral tasks were selected to measure a broad 
range of cognitive attributes including semantic and episodic memory, executive control and 
measures of fluency and creativity. These measures were assessed in three sessions. Each 
session began with a task to index the content and form of mind-wandering (0-back / 1-back 
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task) followed by the other cognitive measures. The order of sessions and the order of tasks 
was counterbalanced across individuals. Details of the 0-back / 1-back task are presented 
below. The complete details of other cognitive tasks are described in the supplementary 
materials. 
0-back / 1-back task. We assessed the contents of experience during mind-wandering 
in the context of a simple task that manipulated working memory load using a block design 
(see Konishi, McLaren, Engen, & Smallwood, 2015; Medea et al., 2016 for prior published 
examples of this task). This task was performed at the beginning of each laboratory session 
to minimize the contribution of participant fatigue to this experiential measures. Measuring 
experience over three days provided us with a more comprehensive description of 
participants’ trait-level mind-wandering than would have been possible in a single 
experimental session.  
In both conditions non-target trials involved the presentation of pairs of shapes 
appearing on the screen divided by a vertical line. The pairs could be: a circle and a square, a 
circle and a triangle, or a square and a triangle for a total of six possible pairs (two different 
left/right configurations for each). The pairs never had shapes of the same kind (e.g. a square 
and a square). In both tasks, following an unpredictable sequence of non-target trials, a target 
trial was presented in which participants had to make a manual response. The target was a 
small stimulus presented in either blue or red across conditions, with the color 
counterbalanced across participants. In the 0-back condition, the target was flanked by one 
of two shapes and participants had to indicate by pressing the appropriate button which 
shape matched the target shape. In the 1-back condition, the target was flanked by two 
question marks and participants had to respond depending on which side the target shape 
was on the prior trial. Responses were made using the left and right arrow keys. Fixation 
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crosses presentation ranged from 1.3–1.7 seconds in steps of 0.05 seconds, non-targets were 
varied from 0.8–1.2 seconds in steps of 0.05 seconds. Targets always ranged from 2.1–2.5 
seconds in steps of 0.05 seconds and a response from participants did not end the target 
presentation. 
There were eight blocks in one session, and each block consisted of two to four mini 
blocks. Each block contained either the 0-back or 1-back condition. The change of condition 
was signaled by the presentation of the word ‘SWITCH’ that remained on screen for five 
seconds. The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants and the whole task 
lasted around 25 minutes. In each mini block, there was one target trial and the number of 
non-target trials preceding the targets varied between one and six. The participants’ 
performance is measured by their efficiency, calculated as:  Efficiency =
− 

  

  . For ease of interpretation, efficiency scores were reversed, so that 
higher scores indicated better performance.  
In order to sample different features of participants’ ongoing experiences, we used 
multidimensional experience sampling (MDES; Medea et al., 2016; Ruby et al., 2013; 
Smallwood et al., 2016). This technique uses self-report to assess the contents of experience 
on a number of dimensions.  The thought probes first asked participants to rate their level of 
task focus (‘My thoughts were focused on the task I was performing’) on a sliding scale from 
0 (completely off-task) to 1 (completely on task). Participants then answered 12 randomly 
presented questions regarding the content and form of their experience at the moment just 
before they were probed. These questions (described in Table 1) were based on prior studies 
adopting this approach to measure self-generated thought (Medea et al., 2016; Ruby et al., 
2013; Smallwood et al., 2016). At the moment of target presentation there was a 20% chance 
of a thought probe being presented instead of a target with a maximum of one probe per 
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condition block of 0-back and 1-back. In each session, an average of 14.07 (SD = 3.30, range 6 
– 25) MDES probes occurred; in the 0-back condition an average of 7.02 (SD = 2.36, range 2 – 
14) MDES probes occurred and in the 1-back condition an average of 7.04 (SD = 2.24, range 1 
– 15) occurred. In total we sampled 7006 examples of experience in this study. In the current 
analysis, we calculated the mean scores of each question across the three sessions for each 
participant. The MDES scores were first transformed into z-scores for mean-centering and 
unit-variance scaling. The scores described the average momentary experience in each 
dimension. We use this score in the multivariate analysis later.  
Table 1. 
Multiple Dimension Experience Sampling questions in 0-back / 1-back task. 
Dimensions Questions 0 1 
Focus 
My thoughts were focused on the task I 
was performing. 
Not at all Completely 
Future My thoughts involved future events. Not at all Completely 
Past My thoughts involved past events. Not at all Completely 
Self My thoughts involved myself. Not at all Completely 
Other My thoughts involved other people. Not at all Completely 
Emotion The content of my thoughts was: Negative Positive 
Images My thoughts were in the form of images. Not at all Completely 
Words My thoughts were in the form of words. Not at all Completely 
Vivid My thoughts were vivid as if I was there. Not at all Completely 
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Vague My thoughts were detailed and specific. Not at all Completely 
Habit 
This thought has recurrent themes similar 
to those I have had before. 
Not at all Completely 
Evolving 
My thoughts tended to evolve in a series 
of steps. 
Not at all Completely 
Spontaneous My thoughts were: Spontaneous Deliberate 
 
Neuroimaging data pre-processing and analysis 
Resting-state fMRI.  Functional and structural data were pre-processed and analyzed 
using FMRIB’s Software Library (FSL version 4.1, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Individual FLAIR and 
T1 weighted structural brain images were extracted using Brain Extraction Tool (BET). 
Structural images were linearly registered to the MNI-152 template using FMRIB's Linear 
Image Registration Tool (FLIRT). The resting state functional data were pre-processed and 
analyzed using the FMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT). The individual subject analysis involved: 
motion correction using MCFLIRT; slice-timing correction using Fourier space time-series 
phase-shifting; high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line 
fitting, with sigma = 200s); Gaussian low-pass temporal filtering, with sigma = 2.8s; six motion 
parameters (as estimated by MCFLIRT) regressed out; cerebrospinal fluid and white matter 
signal regressed out (top five PCA components, CompCor method). No spatial smoothing and 
no global signal regression were applied.  
Network strength analysis. To describe the functional architecture of the DMN, we 
transformed the resting state BOLD time series into connection strength values of the 
selected regions for each participant. The regions of interest (ROIs) were obtained from 
connectivity-based functional parcellation studies of the DMN by Bzdok and colleagues 
(Bzdok et al., 2013, 2016; Bzdok, Eickenberg, Grisel, & Thirion, 2015; Eickhoff, Laird, Fox, 
DIMENSION OF EXPERIENCE  12 
 
Bzdok, & Hensel, 2016; Eickhoff, Thirion, Varoquaux, & Bzdok, 2015). There were 16 selected 
target network nodes, including sub-regions located in the bilateral temporal parietal junction 
(TPJ), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and 
posteromedial cortex (PMC; see Figure 3a). The ROI masks and the related functional 
connectivity network produced with Neurosynth core tools 
(https://github.com/neurosynth/neurosynth) can be found on NeuroVault: 
http://neurovault.org/collections/2275/. First, we extracted and then averaged the time 
series of all voxels within the 6mm sphere masks of the given regions. Second, we created 16 
× 16 symmetrical correlation matrices representing the network of the regions that was 
computed for all the individual subjects. The off-diagonal of each correlation matrix contained 
120 unique region-region connection strengths. This approach provided a measure of 
connection strength of the region-region coupling of the DMN for each participant. 
Multivariate pattern analysis.  We performed a sparse canonical correlation analysis 
(SCCA) on the connection strength data and MDES scores, to yield different dimensions that 
simultaneously described neural organization and experience. Canonical correlation analysis 
(CCA) is an advanced multivariate technique that identifies distinct components between two 
variables spaces (Hardoon, Szedmak, & Shawe-Taylor, 2004).  In our case, brain region 
connection strength values and experiential reports gained through MDES. This modelling 
approach allows linear combinations of the two variable vectors with correlations among 
variables to be determined and, unlike principal component analysis and independent 
component analysis, produces dimensions in which the biological data is simultaneously 
constrained by psychological measures (and vice versa). To enhance the interpretability of 
the decomposition solutions we used a variant of CCA penalized by L1-regularization, SCCA 
(see Hastie, Tibshirani, & Wainwright, 2015). This was achieved by setting a maximum number 
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of brain or behavior variables to exactly zero, results in a regularized version of the singular 
value decomposition. A reliable and robust implementation of the SCCA method was 
retrieved as R package from CRAN (PMA, penalized multivariate analysis). In the current 
analysis, the L1 penalty on resting state functional connectivity was set to 0.3 and to 0.5 for 
the MDES results. Other parameters were set as default. In this way, our analysis performed 
low-rank (i.e. described an overall network pattern by parsimonious set of connectivity 
causes), conjoint (i.e. respected variance in brain and behavior at once), and sparse (i.e. 
automatically found unimportant variables) decomposition of experience and neural data. 
Stability analyses. We performed two analyses to assess the stability of the solutions 
produced by SCCA. First, for each participant, we excluded the MDES data of one random day, 
and then re-calculated the average scores for these question. We repeated the 
decomposition on this new set of MDES data and the network connection strength. This 
corroborative quantitative assessment provides insight into the robustness of the obtained 
findings by a permutation analysis that left one day out at a time. In particular, this procedure 
addresses whether either the first day (when participants may be learning how to respond to 
the experience sampling method) or the last day (when participants may have lower levels of 
motivation) might unduly bias the decomposition solutions. If the average momentary MDES 
responses are stable across three sessions, then they should yield similar latent components. 
Second, we acquired bootstrap samples as a permutation analysis to estimate the variance 
and generalizability of the sample to the population. The bootstrap resamples, each reflecting 
an alternative data sample that we could have obtained from the same distribution, was 
created by random sampling with replacement. The identical SCCA computation was then 
reiterated individually on each of the 1000 perturbed versions of the actual data sample. This 
approach enables quantitative assessment of the quality of the original SCCA estimates by 
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inferring confidence intervals (see Figure S1 in Supplementary Materials for the distributions). 
We selected latent components that were consistent across the decomposition of the original 
sample, a leave-one-day out sample, and a bootstrap sample, as those are the stable 
components that were less biased by the session effect and closer to our best estimation of 
population. We formalized the similarity of these two types of resampling by conducting a 
formal conjunction of the solutions generated through these different methods of 
resampling. To quantify the similarity between the components we performed a conjunction 
that highlights the common elements of each solution. The feature conjunctions were 
calculated as follow:   !"#"$%!" =
&0, )ℎ" +  "!"%$, -%.ℎ/010  ×   "!"%$, -%.ℎ34456 7 < 0.11, )ℎ" +  "!"%$, -%.ℎ/010  ×   "!"%$, -%.ℎ34456 7 > 0.1  .In addition, 
because bootstrapping produces a population estimation of our sample, we used the latent 
component weights produced by this method to compute component scores. This set of 
scores would be used in all subsequent analyses. The source code for this analysis is available 
at https://github.com/htwangtw/DimensionsOfExperience. 
Whole brain analysis. A limitation in our analysis is that we focused on the DMN to 
describe patterns of thought. To overcome this limitations, we generalized the types of 
experience provided by the SCCA by assessing their associations with areas outside of the 
DMN using a process conceptually similar to dual regression (Beckmann, Mackay, Filippini, & 
Smith, 2009). To perform these analyses the resting state functional data were pre-processed 
and analyzed using the FMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT). For the individual subject pre-
processing involved, please see Resting-state fMRI for details.  
Following these pre-processing steps we used a mask produced by the average of the 
DMN ROIs to determine the time series that described this neural system. This time series 
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was used in a whole brain functionality analysis for each participant. This allowed us to 
produce a subject-specific spatial map based on the selected ROIs and these maps were used 
as dependent measures in our group level analysis. To test whether the functional 
connectivity of the DMN ROIs associated with the canonical components we conducted a 
group level analysis using FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects stage 1 (FLAME 1). We 
included the two canonical components on thought reports only, group mean and Jenkinson’s 
mean frame-wise displacement (FD) (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002), to control 
for spurious correlations that may emerge from movement, as explanatory variables in the 
full model. The Jenkinson’s mean FD was calculated by the motion power statistic function in 
Configurable Pipeline for the Analysis of Connectomes (C-PAC; https://fcp-indi.github.io/). A 
50% probabilistic grey matter mask was applied to the result maps and the results were 
thresholded at the whole-brain level using cluster-based Gaussian random field theory, with 
a cluster-forming threshold of Z = 2.6, and a Family-Wise Error corrected cluster significance 
level of p< 0.05. Unthresholded maps were uploaded onto Neurovault and can be found here: 
http://neurovault.org/images/43189/. 
Principal components analysis. To summarize the questionnaire and task data we 
performed an initial data reduction step using principal components analysis (PCA) in SPSS 
(IBM, version 24). This analysis was performed separately for the questionnaires and task 
measures. One hundred and forty-five participants’ data were included in the questionnaire 
items analysis and 157 in the behavioral tasks analysis. The behavioral task measures were 
converted into z-scores to avoid data distortions derived from the difference in score means. 
Missing data was imputed by mean scores in both analyses. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy (KMO) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity were conducted to measure the 
sampling adequacy of the model. Components were selected based on the elbow in the scree 
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plot (see Figure S2 in Supplementary Materials) and varimax rotation was used to maximize 
the distinctiveness of each solution. 
 
Figure 2.  
The results of a decomposition of the battery of (a) laboratory tasks collected in this 
experiment and (b) questionnaires. The heat map describes the loadings of each measure. 
For the scree plots describing the Eigen values for each dimension, please refer to Figure S2 
in Supplementary Materials. In (a), the components are (i) semantic memory (SEM); (ii) 
executive control (EXE); (iii) the generation of information (GEN). In (b) the components are 
(i) affective disturbance (AD); (ii) social interaction (SOC); (iii) dyslexia (DYSL); (iv) attention to 
detail (ATT).  
In the PCA of the phenotypical variation measured by laboratory tasks, Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity was significant (χ 2(210) = 775.01, p < .001), indicating that it is appropriate to 
apply PCA to these data. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy indicated 
that there were good relationships among the variables in the current sample was acceptable 
(KMO = 0.79). The PCA of task performance revealed three principal components with a clear 
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elbow after the third component observed in the scree plot. The three orthogonal 
components accounted for 41% of the total variance with produced component loading 
patterns shown in Figure 2a. The three components, which accounted for 24%, 8% and 7% of 
the variance respectively, can be interpreted as the three aspects of cognitive functioning: (i) 
semantic memory (SEM); (ii) executive control (EXE); (iii) the generation of information (GEN, 
including letter or category fluency and the generation of creative solutions). 
In the PCA of the questionnaire data, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ 
2(105) = 919.78, p<0.001), indicating that PCA is an appropriate model for the data and the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy indicated that there were strong 
relationships among the variables (KMO = 0.82). The application of PCA to the questionnaire 
data revealed four components with a clear elbow after the fourth component observed in 
the scree plot. The four orthogonal components accounted for 65% of the total variance with 
produced component loading patterns shown in Figure 2b. The four components accounted 
for 35%, 14%, 9% and 7% of the variance respectively. The first component was anchored at 
one end by high levels of depression and rumination and at the other by high levels of well-
being, termed as ‘Affective Disturbance’. The second component was associated with high 
scores on four of the five autism subscales, excluding the attention to detail subscale. The 
third component loaded on both components of ADHD and dyslexia. The fourth component 
loaded on trait anxiety and high levels of attention to detail as measured by the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient. We analyzed these data using a MANOVA in which the dependent 
variables were the PCA loadings produced by the decomposition of the questionnaires and 
the independent variables were the canonical component loadings. 
 
Results 
DIMENSION OF EXPERIENCE  18 
 
Determining consistent categories of experience 
We applied SCCA to the network connection strength values among regions of interest 
in the DMN and the average scores on the experiential reports gained in the laboratory. We 
accepted 13 canonical components generated by SCCA (see Figure S3 in Supplementary 
Materials for the complete set). Of these initial components, two were consistent when we 
randomly removed the MDES reports of one day per participant and when bootstrapping was 
used to provide a more comprehensive description of the sample (see Methods). The 
consistency of these patterns across the three different analyses indicates that in qualitative 
terms they are not unduly biased by a particular session of our study and are likely to provide 
adequate estimation to the population (Figure 3b). These stable components are presented 
in Figure 3c in which we show both the Bootstrapping (BOOTS) and as well as the analysis that 
randomly excluded one session (restricted temporal sampling, RTS), and the common 
elements of each solutions.  
Canonical component 1 reflects a pattern of stronger coupling within the mPFC, as 
well as between the left inferior parietal cortex (TPJ-2). This pattern of integration within key 
nodes of the DMN was associated with descriptions of experience as positive, evolving and 
habitual. We will refer to this as positive-habitual experiences. Canonical component 2 was 
associated with relatively weak patterns of coupling between the pCC bilaterally (TPJ-2 and -
4) and regions of the mPFC (vmPFC-1, 5 & 6). This component was associated with thoughts 
that were task unrelated and non-deliberate. We will refer to this component as spontaneous 
off-task experiences. 
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Figure 3. Results of the multivariate pattern analysis.  
The upper sub panel (a) describes the regions of interest from which the network connection 
strength was calculated while the lower panel (b) describes the correlation between the 
different decomposition solutions. The right panel (c) is the results of SCCA conducted on the 
network connection strength values of key nodes of the DMN at rest and self-reports of 
experience during a laboratory task. The different rows of the matrix reflect the different 
neurocognitive categories produced by this analysis. The different columns describe different 
applications designed to assess the consistency of the solutions restricted temporal sampling 
(RTS) describes the canonical components produced when the data from one day of each 
participant was randomly removed from the decomposition. Bootstrapping (BOOTS) 
describes the solution produced using bootstrapping (see Methods for details). We 
highlighted the conjunction features between RTS and BOOTS in the right column ‘Common’.  
Validating the categories of experience 
Having identified two reliable dimensions of neurocognitive experience, we tested 
whether these patterns accounted for additional variance in the measures that we collected 
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in our experiment. Our first analysis involved a whole brain analysis aimed at determining if 
the different patterns of experience were associated with differential communication from 
the DMN to other areas of the brain. In this analysis, we first employed dual regression to 
calculate the subject-specific spatial maps describing the correlation of DMN and the whole 
brain, and then used these spatial maps as dependent measures in a group level multiple 
regression in which the participants’ variation in positive habitual and spontaneous off-task 
experiences were both explanatory variables of interest (See Methods). This analysis revealed 
a pattern of regions whose connectivity was differentially related to the dimensions of 
positive habitual and spontaneous off-task experiences. These regions were the left temporo-
parietal cortex, left hippocampus/entorhinal cortex, left lateral middle temporal gyrus and 
the left pre-supplementary region. Extraction of the connectivity in this network and plotting 
these against the different types of experience revealed that these regions showed a pattern 
of connectivity that was linked to the expression of positive-habitual experiences but was 
unrelated to levels of spontaneous off-task experiences. These data are consistent with 
previous studies that show medial-temporal connectivity with the DMN is linked to aspects 
of spontaneous experience such as episodic thought (Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017) and online 
studies that show that activity in this region is important during mind-wandering states (e.g. 
Ellamil et al., 2016). It also confirm theoretical accounts of states of mind-wandering as relying 
on regions that fall outside of the core of the DMN, such as the pre-supplementary motor 
area (pre-SMA; Christoff et al., 2016). 
Next, we explored whether the different canonical components had specific 
implications for performance on the tasks in which we assessed the experience (i.e. the 0-
back and the 1-back conditions of the laboratory task). Since the SCCA depends on resting 
state data which was recorded independently of the task, we were unable to estimate the 
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canonical components separately for each task. Consequently, in these analyses we explored 
whether overall differences in canonical component loadings across participants were 
associated with performance efficiency on the 0-back / 1-back tasks. We used a repeated 
measures analysis of variance in which the dependent variable was the efficiency with which 
participants performed the 0-back and 1-back task respectively. This analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between task efficiency and variation in our spontaneous-off task 
component (F(1, 154) = 6.43, p = .012, η2p  = .04).  Decomposition of this interaction showed 
that participants scoring higher on spontaneous off-task experience performed better on the 
0-back condition (t(151) = 2.38, p = .019, η2p  = .04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.11]) and worse on the 1-
back condition (t(151) = -2.55, p = .012, η2p  = .04, 95% CI [-0.15, -0.02]). The differential 
relationship between the levels of spontaneous-off task experience and performance on 
the0-back / 1-back task is summarized in the form of a scatter plot in Figure 4.  These data 
confirm accounts that suggest that attentional lapses linked to mind-wandering are context 
dependent, tending to impact negatively during demanding tasks (Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna, 2013); they are also consistent with prior studies suggesting that context regulation 
may be more problematic for spontaneous than deliberate mind-wandering (see also Seli et 
al., 2016). 
Finally, we used Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) to determine how the 
patterns of experience revealed by SCCA are related to the decompositions of the battery of 
cognitive performance and questionnaire measures. In this analysis, principal components 
analysis scores describing either phenotypical variation or questionnaire measures on each of 
the components of cognitive function were the independent variables and the individual 
loadings for each of the two canonical components describing experience from the SCCA were 
the dependent variables. For the analysis of phenotypical variation, this produced two 
DIMENSION OF EXPERIENCE  22 
 
significant results with the executive control component (F(2, 152) = 5.84, p = .006, η2p = .065) 
and the generation of information component (F(2, 152) = 3.41, p = .007, η2p  = .065). Higher 
loadings on the positive-habitual component (F(1, 153) = 9.84, p = .002, η2p  = .060) were 
associated with worse performance on tasks requiring executive control (t(153) = -3.14, p = 
.002, η2p  = .060,  95% CI [-0.32, -0.07]) and higher loadings on the spontaneous-off task 
experience component (F(1, 153) = 10.15, p = .002, η2p  = .062) were associated with better 
performance on tasks involving the generation of information (such as creativity) (t(153) = 
3.19, p = .002, η2p  = .062, 95% CI [0.08, 0.33]). This indicates that two of the experiential 
components identified by the SCCA were uniquely associated with poor performance on 
executively demanding tasks and better performance on measures of creativity: both aspects 
of psychological functioning that have previously been linked to mind-wandering (e.g. Baird 
et al., 2012; McVay & Kane, 2009). The relationships for both neurocognitive dimensions are 
summarized in the form of a scatter plot in Figure 4. 
In terms of the relationship to the questionnaire decomposition, we found a 
significant association with the first principal component (F(2, 151) = 3.76, p = .026, η2p  = .05) 
which captured affective disturbance. This revealed two significant relationships: (i) a strong 
association with the positive-habitual component (F(1, 152) = 6.13, p = .014, η2p  = .04), 
suggesting a negative association between positive-habitual thought and levels of affective 
disturbance (t(152) = -2.48, p =.014, η2p = .04, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.03]), and (ii) an association with 
the spontaneous-off task experience component (F(1, 152) = 4.55, p = .035, η2p  = .03)  
suggesting that higher loadings on the spontaneous-off task component were associated with 
higher levels of affective disturbance (t(152) = 2.13, p = .035, η2p  = .03, 95% CI [0.11, 0.28]). 
This analysis demonstrates that the different canonical component components have 
dissociable associations with respect to well-being, capturing aspects of the bi-directional 
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relationship between the mind-wandering state and affective disturbance highlighted by 
prior research (e.g. Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Ruby et al., 2013). Importantly, our analysis 
demonstrates that the different canonical components have dissociable associations with 
respect to well-being, demonstrating that our method captures both elements of the 
apparently contradictory analysis linking the mind-wandering state to well-being that has 
been highlighted by prior research. 
 
Figure 4.  
The relationship between the different neural-cognitive components and the laboratory and 
questionnaire measures. The left panel (a) shows the result of whole brain analysis 
characterizing the correlation between connectivity between the DMN mask and different 
neural regions and the different experience components. The right panel (b) describes the 
relationship between the different canonical components with measures of well-being and 
task performance. 
 The effect of motion. One concern with resting state functional connectivity arises 
from the possibility that the connectivity matrices are unduly affected by individual 
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differences in motion (Power et al., 2014). Consistent with the possibility that motion may 
influence our results we observed a correlation at the group level between the positive–
habitual component (r(155) = .363, p <. 001) but not for the spontaneous off-task experience 
component (r(155) = -.097, p = .229). Hence we assessed the contribution of this association 
to our results linking positive-habitual thought to our measured phenotypes. We performed 
a series of step-wise analyses to identify the contribution that motion makes to the 
phenotypical associations with positive-habitual thought. In these analyses the canonical 
component was the dependent variable, we entered the principal components describing 
cognition or well-being in the first step and the mean FD as calculated by Jenkinson and 
colleagues in the second step. Including motion significantly improved the predictive value of 
the model for well-being and cognition (Well-being: Model 1: R2 = .06, F(4, 152) = 2.21, p = .07, 
η2p = 0.06, Model 2: R2 = .19, F(5, 151) = 6.95, p <.001, η2p = 0.19, Model Change: R2Change= .13, 
FChange(1, 151) = 24.51, p < .001; Cognition: Model 1: R2 = .07, F(3, 153) = 3.92, p = .010, , η2p  
= .07, Model 2: R2 = .18, F(4, 152) = 8.22, p < .001, η2p  = 0.18, Model Change: R2Change= .11, 
FChange(1, 152) = 19.65, p <. 001). In the case of well-being, the explained variance of the 
affective disturbance component was not improved with the inclusion of motion (Model 1: 
Affective Disturbance β = -.20, t(152) = -2.48, p = .014, η2p  = .04, 95% CI [-0.29, -0.03]; Model 
2: Affective Disturbance β = -.20, t(151) = -2.59, p =.011, η2p  = .05, 95% CI [-0.28, -0.03], Model 
2: Mean FD β = .36, t(151) = 4.94, p<.001, η2p  = .14, 95% CI [3.29, 7.67]). Thus the relationship 
between affective disturbance and positive-habitual thought remained largely unchanged by 
the inclusion of motion as nuisance variable.  In the case of cognition, executive control 
accounted for less variance in the positive-habitual component when Mean FD was included 
(Model 1: Executive Control β = -.24, t(153) = -3.14, p = .002, η2p  = .06, 95% CI [-0.32, -0.07], 
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Model 2: Executive Control β = -.16, t(152) = -2.17, p = .032, η2p  = .03, 95% CI [-0.25, -0.01]; 
Model 2: β = -.34, Mean FD t(152) = 4.43, p < .001, η2p  = .11, 95% CI [4.82, 12.56]).  
Unlike the well-being analysis, motion explained a substantial amount of variance that 
was shared in the relationship between executive control and positive-habitual thought. To 
explore whether the positive-habitual component reflected an artefact of motion, we 
selected participants for whom movement greater than 0.2mm occurred on less than 5% of 
the resting state data (N = 134) and re ran the SCCA with the identical pipeline. This produced 
similar solutions for both positive-habitual and spontaneous off-task thought (see 
Supplementary Figure S4). Importantly, positive-habitual thought was not significant 
correlated with motion (r(132) = .10, p = .236) but was correlated with poor executive control 
(r(155) = -.26, p = .001; see Table S1 in supplementary materials for the full set of correlations). 
This final analysis shows that in a more restricted sample in which motion does not correlate 
with either latent component, we still observe a relationship between positive-habitual 
thought and poor executive control. 
 
Discussion 
Using multivariate pattern analysis, our study demonstrated that the content of the 
mind-wandering state is heterogeneous and confirmed hypotheses that different types of 
experience have differing functional associations (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Using 
a novel analysis strategy we simultaneously decomposed self-reports of experience with 
descriptions of neural organization, revealing dimensions of experience with unique 
phenotypical associations: positive-habitual experiences and spontaneous off-task thoughts. 
Poor executive control, a well-documented association of mind-wandering (McVay & 
Kane, 2009) predicted variation in positive habitual thoughts. This pattern of thinking was 
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linked to coupling in the mPFC, a region important for assigning value to neural signals (Roy, 
Shohamy, & Wager, 2012). It is possible that deficits in executive control during mind-
wandering emerge because of problems in assigning value to an external task, a view 
supported by evidence that financial motivation limits the impact of mind-wandering on 
performance (Mrazek et al., 2012). We found that spontaneous off-task experiences 
simultaneously underlie the association between mind-wandering and tasks of creativity 
(Baird et al., 2012) as well as problems in performing tasks requiring continuous monitoring 
of external information. Finally, while positive-habitual experiences are linked to improved 
well-being, spontaneous off-task experiences are associated with increased affective 
disturbance, capturing the apparent contradiction that mind-wandering can be associated 
with both negative (e.g. Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and positive (e.g. Poerio et al., 2016) 
emotional states. Together these data provide the most convincing evidence to date that 
experience during mind-wandering unfolds along a set of underlying dimensions and that 
these explain many of the phenotypical associations that have hitherto been associated with 
the mind-wandering state (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). 
Our study also demonstrates the complex contribution of the DMN makes to 
cognition. Strong DMN connectivity at rest was associated with an increased tendency for 
positive-habitual thoughts about the future, corroborating previous research linking the DMN 
to mental time travel (Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). 
Participants also rated these experiences as habitual, a pattern that supports accounts of the 
role of the DMN in cognition as emphasizing automatic influences during mind-wandering 
(Christoff et al., 2016). Spontaneous off-task thoughts, in contrast, showed weaker 
integration between core DMN regions and were linked to poor performance on the 1-back 
task, a context when task performance depends on the DMN functioning as a coherent 
DIMENSION OF EXPERIENCE  27 
 
network (Konishi et al., 2015). More generally, we found that states of high connectivity 
within the DMN (positive habitual thoughts) were associated with more functional coupling 
to regions outside of the core network - a key prediction of the view that activity within the 
DMN reflects the integration of information from across the cortex (Margulies et al., 2016). It 
is important to note that our analysis shows that the behavior of the DMN at rest contains 
information about individual variation in the type of experiences that emerge during mind-
wandering. These data should not be taken as evidence that this system is exclusive in its role 
in mind-wandering. Indeed, our whole brain regression provides quantitative evidence that 
the interactions of DMN with other regions, including those in the medial temporal lobe and 
the executive system (e.g. pre-SMA), are also important. In this way our study supports recent  
theoretical perspectives (e.g. Christoff et al., 2016; Margulies et al., 2016), as well as prior 
empirical results  (e.g. Ellamil et al., 2016; Golchert et al., 2017; Smallwood et al., 2016) 
highlighting that regions other than the DMN core are important for mind-wandering. 
There are a number of limitations in the current analysis. First, our study focused on 
describing mind-wandering as a trait. Prior work has shown similarities between state and 
trait measures of mind-wandering  in terms of (a) neural processing (e.g. trait: Smallwood et 
al., 2016; state: Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011) and (b) psychological processes such as working capacity (e.g. 
trait: McVay & Kane, 2009; state: Mrazek et al., 2012) and happiness (e.g. trait: Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; state: Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). Nonetheless there are 
certain aspects of mind-wandering that can only be understood by treating it as a state, such 
as its temporal features (Christoff et al., 2016).  Second, our study measured mind-wandering 
in the laboratory. Although there is a correspondence between mind-wandering in laboratory 
and naturalistic settings, (e.g. McVay, Kane, & Kwa
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on the contexts in which the experience emerges. Consequently, our findings should be 
supplemented by studies examining the occurrence of different types of experience in 
ecologically valid settings. Finally, our study did not find evidence for links with tasks that rely 
on semantic memory or for links to psychological traits other than well-being. This may have 
been due to our selection of neural regions, or from our selection of questions. Prior studies 
have linked regions in the temporal lobe to the contents of thought (e.g. Smallwood et al., 
2016), a pattern of data that are consistent with a role of the semantic system in spontaneous 
thought (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009). Other work has highlighted awareness of 
mind-wandering as important in traits such as ADHD (Franklin et al., 2014). We anticipate that 
extending the selected regions of cortex and the aspects of experience measured may extend 
our understanding of the mind-wandering state to encompass forms of semantic processing 
and additional psychological traits. 
In closing, our study provides the strongest evidence to date that the mind-wandering 
state is heterogeneous in its content, neural basis and functional associations. We describe 
two neurocognitive dimensions capturing associations with attentional lapses, creativity and 
well-being, confirming much of the research on mind-wandering conducted over the last 
decade. However, we also provide an explanation for why scientific accounts of mind-
wandering have been dominated by controversy, such as its relationship to happiness 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), creativity (Smeekens & Kane, 2016), executive control (McVay 
& Kane, 2009) and the DMN (Gilbert, Dumontheil, Simons, Frith, & Burgess, 2007). Our data 
suggest these debates emerge from an erroneous assumption that mind-wandering is a 
unitary psychological construct, when it is in fact, made up of distinct states with unique 
neural correlates and functional associations. This ontological uncertainty has led to artificial 
controversies that hinder the development of a mature science of internal experience. 
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Although our findings do not capture the full range of experiential dimensions on which the 
mind can wander, they convincingly demonstrate that it is untenable to characterize mind-
wandering as a uniform experience. As a discipline, we must embrace methodologies and 
analytical techniques that capture the complex nature of internal experiences, allowing us to 
accurately determine the contribution that they make to our lives. 
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